

## Message Text

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E:RCOOPER  
IO:CWMAYNES  
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 190267 TOSEC 080303

EXDIS, FOR MOOSE AND SECRETARY'S PARTY FROM MAYNES

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PORG, RH, SF

SUBJECT: RHODESIA: PRESSURES AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

1. A CRITICAL ELEMENT OF THE INITIATIVE TO BE  
UNDERTAKEN WITH THE UK ON RHODESIA IS THE NATURE OF  
THE PRESSURES TO BE APPLIED, IF NECESSARY, AGAINST  
SOUTH AFRICA. THE PRESSURES ARE DESIGNED TO:

--CONVINCE SOUTH AFRICA THAT IT MUST TAKE THE  
STEPS NECESSARY TO BRING ABOUT SMITH'S WITHDRAWAL.

--CONVINCE THE FRONT LINE STATES OF OUR DETERMINATION  
AND THUS LEAD THEM TO DELIVER THE NATIONALIST FORCES.  
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2. WE DISCUSSED WITH THE UK AD REFEREDUM ON JULY 28-29  
THE TYPES OF MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN. THESE  
WERE SUMMARIZED IN A PAPER WHICH WE SENT TO THE UK  
FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH THE STRONG CAVEAT THAT U.S.  
DECISIONS ON THE SPECIFIC MEASURES DESCRIBED ARE STILL  
PENDING AND WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE UK'S VIEWS (THE

TEXT OF THE PAPER WAS CONTAINED IN STATE 180391, BEING REPEATED SEPARATELY TO YOU).

3. AFTER CONSIDERING THE POSSIBLE MEASURES THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, THE BRITISH CABINET DECIDED ON EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS STEPS. THEY ARE WILLING TO ASK:

--THE OIL COMPANIES VOLUNTARILY TO INSTITUTE A SYSTEM OF END USER CERTIFICATION.

--THE SHAH TO EXPRESS TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HIS SUPPORT OF THE UK-US INITIATIVE ON RHODESIA.

THE BRITISH ARE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE A MANDATORY ARMS EMBARGO ONLY AS A LAST RESORT (DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY NOW HAVE A VOLUNTARY ARMS EMBARGO IN FORCE AND A MANDATORY EMBARGO WOULD BE JUSTIFIED UNDER EXISTING CHAPTER 7 SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.) THEY ALSO EXPRESSED A READINESS TO PROCEED WITH A SYSTEM OF END USER CERTIFICATES IMPOSED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IF NECESSARY.

4. IN OUR VIEW, THE TWO LIMITED MEASURES WHICH THE BRITISH ARE NOW READY TO TAKE WILL NOT PROVE CONFIDENTIAL

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ADEQUATE TO THE TASK, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF VORSTER'S SPEECH LAST WEEK ACCUSING US OF PURSUING "STRANGULATION WITH FINESSE." THE UK'S PROPOSED MEASURES WILL NEITHER INTIMIDATE THE SOUTH AFRICANS NOR PERSUADE THE FRONT LINE STATES THAT WE MEAN TO BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA.

5. IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH OWEN, WE SUGGEST THAT YOU CONCUR IN THE TACTIC RECOMMENDED BY THE BRITISH:

--EMPHASIZE THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF OUR RHODESIAN PACKAGE AND SEEK TO PERSUADE SOUTH AFRICA TO GIVE THE PACKAGE ITS FULL SUPPORT.

--DO NOT DESCRIBE TO BOTHA SPECIFIC MEASURES THAT WE WOULD TAKE IN THE EVENT SOUTH AFRICA FAILS TO BRING ABOUT RHODESIAN COOPERATION.

--INSTEAD, SAY THAT IN THE EVENT THE EFFORTS FAIL, THERE WILL BE OVERWHELMING INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE FOR FURTHER ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO RHODESIA; THESE ACTIONS ARE BOUND TO IMPINGE ON SOUTH AFRICA; AND

THAT WE DO NOT CONTEMPLATE RESISTING ALL OF THE PRESSURES FOR ACTIONS.

6. IN YOUR PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH OWEN, WE RECOMMEND THAT YOU URGE UPON HIM PREPARATIONS FOR A MORE FORCEFUL SERIES OF MEASURES THAN THE UK IS CURRENTLY WILLING TO UNDERTAKE:

--WE SHOULD ASK THE SHAH TO EXPRESS HIS CONCERN TO VORSTER ABOUT DIVERSIONS TO RHODESIA. (YOU WILL HAVE SEEN A REPORT TO THE BRITISH THAT THE IRANIANS MAY HAVE ALREADY TAKEN SOME ACTION ON THESE LINES, BUT THE REPORT'S ACCURACY HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED; NEITHER DID THE SHAH MENTION IT TO THE U.S. AND UK  
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AMBASSADOR ON AUGUST 9 WHEN THEY BRIEFED THE SHAH ON OUR RHODESIAN PLANS.)

--THE COUNCIL TO IMPOSE A MANDATORY ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, BASING ITS ACTION UPON THE PRESENT CHAPTER 7 FINDING AGAINST RHODESIA.

--THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO INSTITUTE A SYSTEM OF END USER CERTIFICATES ON DIVERSION OF OIL SHIPMENTS.

THESE CERTIFICATES WOULD BE REQUIRED FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA. WE RECOGNIZE THAT MOST SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS WILL INSIST THAT THE CERTIFICATIONS APPLY BOTH TO DIVERSION OF IMPORTS AND TO THE USE OF IMPORTS TO REPLACE SOUTH AFRICAN OIL SHIPPED TO RHODESIA. WE WOULD BE UNDER STRONG PRESSURE TO AGREE TO THE MORE FAR REACHING MEASURE.

7. DICK COOPER ASKED THAT WE EMPHASIZE HIS VERY STRONG RESERVATIONS ABOUT ANY PRESSURES AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA BASED UPON OIL. ENFORCEMENT OF END USER CERTIFICATES IS COMPLEX AND NECESSARILY IMPERFECT. RHODESIAN OIL REQUIREMENTS ARE LESS THAN FIVE PERCENT OF SOUTH AFRICA'S OIL REQUIREMENTS AND LESS THAN ONE-HALF OF ONE PERCENT OF SOUTH AFRICA'S TOTAL ENERGY REQUIREMENTS. UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, EFFECTIVE CONTROL ON OIL TO RHODESIA IS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT SOUTH AFRICA'S WHOLEHEARTED COOPERATION AT THE RHODESIAN BORDER. WITHOUT THAT, CONTINUED FLOW OF OIL TO RHODESIA WILL LEAD TO CHARGES OF BAD FAITH AND CALLS FOR STRONG ACTION AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, PUTTING THE US IN THE AWKWARD POSITION OF HAVING TO BACK AWAY OR OF HAVING TO SUPPORT A SECONDARY BOYCOTT AND AN OIL EMBARGO,  
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BOTH OF WHICH WOULD INVOKE RECENT MEMORIES WITH THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND WOULD LEND MORAL WEIGHT TO USE OF THESE WEAPONS BY OTHER COUNTRIES ON OTHER OCCASIONS.

8. THE CASE FOR INCLUDING OIL IS THE FOLLOWING:

(A) WHILE THERE IS NO DENYING THE DIFFICULTY OF ENFORCING MEASURES BASED UPON OIL, THE PURPOSE OF THE MEASURE IS POLITICAL, NOT ECONOMIC;

(B) A NUMBER OF OUR ALLIES BY NOW KNOW THAT WE AND THE UK ARE CONSIDERING OIL MEASURES;

(C) SOUTH AFRICA'S CONTROL OF THE FRONTIER TO RHODESIA IS SUFFICIENTLY TIGHT THAT ANY SIGNIFICANT DIVERSION OF OIL COULD HARDLY OCCUR WITHOUT SOUTH AFRICAN COOPERATION,

(D) THE UK CLEARLY PREFERS MEASURES BASED ON OIL RATHER THAN OTHERS SUCH AS A MORATORIUM ON NEW INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA WHICH WOULD NOT BE SPECIFIC TO RHODESIA AND WHICH COULD DIRECTLY AFFECT BRITISH INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA;

(E) TO HAVE A CREDIBLE POLICY ON RHODESIA, WE MUST BE IN A POSITION TO PERSUADE EITHER SOUTH AFRICA OR THE FRONT LINE STATES OF OUR SERIOUSNESS, YET THE BRITISH PACKAGE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DO THIS;

(F) ALTHOUGH THERE WILL BE PRESSURE TO MOVE TO MORE STRINGENT MEASURES ON OIL, AND PERHAPS TO A FULL EMBARGO IF SOUTH AFRICA DOES NOT COOPERATE, WE ARE IN A POSITION TACTICALLY TO CONTROL EVENTS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL (WITH FIVE WESTERN VOTES AND WITH THE VETO) IF WE ARE DETERMINED TO DO SO. AS FAR AS ANY EFFORT IN THE FUTURE TO APPLY OIL SANCTIONS IN

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OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES AND TO OTHER COUNTRIES, IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECALL THAT ACTION AGAINST RHODESIA IS BASED ON A CHAPTER VII FINDING, WHICH IS MANDATORY AND WHICH SOUTH AFRICA IS VIOLATING. OUR VETO CAN PREVENT CHAPTER VII FINDINGS AND CONSEQUENCES AGAINST OTHER COUNTRIES IN OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES.

9. SEPARATE S/P VIEWS BEING SENT SEPTTEL.

CHRISTOPHER

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## Message Attributes

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